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sector would then become essential to promoting 
national security.  Nations leading up to the early 
20th century were all too eager to flex their military 
muscles, yet the period following World War II to the 
present showed the necessity of emphasis and reliance 
on economic superiority as much as military strength. 
groWth + r&D
A nation’s ability to grow its economy soon became 
strategic to military planning. This was established 
predominantly through innovation, as well as the ease 
of which factors of production were accumulated, 
specifically raw materials. The Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) 
determined that “innovation has long been recognized 
as a main driver of economic growth, through the 
development and exploitation of ideas for new 
products and processes.”128  
For growth to truly be fueled by R&D, protected 
intellectual property (“IP”) rights are an essential 
element to allow individuals, companies, and countries 
to utilize the worthwhile investment to formulate 
and apply a new idea. Without adequate protection 
of these intellectual property rights, the incentive to 
develop new ideas and products would be reduced, 
thereby weakening the innovation process.129 The risks 
of doing R&D become unfeasible when the costs to 
develop exceed the benefit of the new product, or 
when the security measure designed to protect IP 
slows development or comes to a standstill.  Gelhorn, 
the university professor Emeritus at Columbia, wrote 
that the United States was purchasing security during 
the Cold War, but only at the expense of progress. 
He maintains that a secret program’s nature of 
apprehensiveness and compartmentalization hinders 
the forward progress of scientific energies into the 
unexplored areas.130 He details an example at Los 
Alamos in the 1950s where Security Services personnel 
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far outnumbered the scientists at the location.131 
Yet according to the National Counter-Intelligence 
Executive, Robert “Bear” Bryant, the R&D of both 
public and private sectors is estimated at $400 billion 
annually.14
 
information technoLogy
The contest to develop and bring to market the 
newest innovation or idea requires a centralized 
hub for engineers, consultants, and designers to 
amalgamate their separate work.  The race begun in 
the 1940s to collect radioactive material for nuclear 
weapons and civil electricity also brought about 
changes to electronics and computational theory; 
their byproducts, the microprocessor and computer, 
would revolutionize the way wars are fought and how 
money is made. 
Information technology (IT), and the way in 
which information is stored and distributed, emerged 
as a way to allow more involvement from more 
individuals in different locations. A theory developed 
from computer usage, and argued during the early 
1990s, was the idea of the interrelatedness between 
the military and the economy. The main tenets of 
the concept known as network-centric warfare was 
that information technology had revolutionized and 
had fundamentally changed both war and business 
through its interconnected nature.132 As Admiral 
Arthur Cebrowski stated, “nations make war the same 
way they make wealth.” Just as success in business 
depends on the ability to circulate information, the 
same is true of militaries; the victorious army is the 
one which obtains and properly applies the most 
accurate information.133
eSpionage
With the digitization of theories and ease of 
developing complex ideas, innovation and economic 
growth have exponentially increased. The development 
of the computers and the networks to connect them 
131 Ibid, 3.
132 Herspring, Dale. Rumsfeld’s Wars: The Arrogance of Power. (Lawrence: 
University Press of Kansas, 30 April 2008), 26.
133 Ibid.
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From the earliest days of nation-states, measures of 
power have been displayed by emphasizing the size and 
superiority of military force. The 16th through the early 
20th century saw the increasing size of armed forces as 
the rest of the world began to appreciate the might and 
strength of the Spanish Armada, the British Royal Navy, 
the Imperial Japanese Navy, and the American Carrier 
Battle Group. The expansion of naval forces allowed 
countries to colonize lands, gather raw materials, and 
assist in their global hegemony. Following the end of 
World War II and the development of nuclear weapons, 
a transformational shift grew out of the dependency to 
have cutting edge military technology and the materials 
to develop them. The strength of nations thus became tied 
proportionately to the development of the military force’s 
innovation as well as its size.
miLitary innovation
 
Military planners were concerned to a lesser extent 
with having the largest fighting force rather the most 
adept at fighting the battles throughout the 20th and 
21st centuries.  For the military force of the latter 
20th century, “the degree of national security rapidly 
declines when reliance is placed on the quantity of 
existing equipment instead of its quality.”123  While 
the U.S. Air Force was the branch most concerned 
with this during the nuclear era of development, that 
quote is universal to all branches of the military in that 
“[t]he first essential of air power [or any other power] 
necessary for peace and security is pre-eminence in 
research.”124 The advanced research & development 
(R&D) that had grown out of the Manhattan 
Project and the shared mutual-interdependence 
of uniting civilian and military personnel had 
historically been overseen by military command. 
By 1950, military R&D contracts numbered nearly 
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124 Ibid, 31.
20,000.125 Although the numbers will have grown 
since the 1950s, estimates placed military R&D 
costs in the neighborhood of $600 million. That 
amounts to nearly one cent of every dollar paid 
in federal taxes being spent for research towards 
more effective weapons, equipment, medicines, and 
utilization of human resources in war.126 
civiLian innovation
 
Yet now, more than in any previous period, 
research and innovation is fostered under private 
control. Historically, military officers held an 
advantage over their civilian counterparts when it 
came to thinking through the dilemmas of warfare; 
however, the development of nuclear weapons 
leveled the playing field.127 The technical superiority 
that is pursued in research universities, private 
research labs, and by individual entrepreneurs has 
most recently coexisted alongside R&D currently 
undertaken in Federal agencies such as the United 
States’ Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) and its northern neighbor, Defense 
Research and Development Canada (DRDC). While 
government agencies’ progress is delayed due to the 
red tape of governmental bureaucracies, their civilian 
counterparts are able to efficiently bring new products 
to market because of the demand to gain a market 
advantage. Many programs receiving federal funds 
have numerous officials and politicians with a say in 
the matter that may have their own agenda or wish 
to impose specific requirements relevant to their 
department or their county. 
This is best described by analogy: while something 
like a horse may have been originally conceptualized, 
specialized in purpose and required only to run quickly, 
the end product after oversight and bureaucracy may 
turn out to be something that resembles a camel; an 
odd creature fairly adequate at doing multiple generic 
tasks or responsibilities. The independence then of 
the military from the civilian sphere was defunct and 
the cohesion of the government, military, and private 
125 Gellhorn, Walter. Security, Loyalty, and Science. (Ithaca, New York: 
Cornell University Press, 1950), 1-2.
126 Mahnken, 31.
127 Ibid, 26.
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•	civilian	and	dual-use	technologies
- especially in sectors likely to experience fast 
growth, such as clean energy and healthcare/
pharmaceuticals 
Furthermore, a 2007 report to Congress notes:
Foreign collectors attempted to obtain information 
and technologies from each of the 20 categories 
on the Developing Sciences and Technologies List 
(DSTL). The DSTL is a compendium of scientific 
and technological capabilities being developed 
worldwide that have the potential to significantly 
enhance or degrade US military capabilities in 
the future.138
The theft of American IP that has escalated in the 
21st century occurs through illegal use of HUMINT 
gathering as well as the marginally less ominous open-
source Competitive Intelligence Solution (CIS), an 
extension of Business Market Analysis.  By using 
legal loopholes, foreign entities are able to utilize 
CIS and acquisitions of American enterprises to 
retain the company’s IP and optimize it for their own 
domestic purposes. 
 
138 Ibid.
China, through its sheer number of possible 
recruits, exploits the population base by employing its 
trademark human-wave/mosaic intelligence gathering 
sources to gather IP and foreign technologies.  The 
gathering of intelligence through open source 
channels and the collection of many small pieces of 
intelligence that have significance only when put 
together with the rest of the pieces is a daunting chore. 
While not exclusive to China, it is capable only by 
a country with a large network of analysts available. 
Although it is a tedious task, it indicates their patience 
in applying the notion implemented under Chairman 
Mao known as “Guanxi;” the development of personal 
networks used to gain favors.139  These networks utilize 
Chinese migrants in the West to obtain technological 
and economic intelligence that is crucial to its national 
development.140 The reliance on Chinese nationals for 
intelligence gathering and implementation of Guanxi 
networks shows the distrust toward foreigners; the 
Chinese Ministry for State Security (MSS) traditionally 
gathers intelligence through ethnic Chinese only.141 
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has eased the flow of information. Unfortunately, as 
exponential as the growth in ideas and innovation has 
been, likewise has the relative ease for those ideas and 
innovations to be acquired and exploited by forces 
external to the R&D, and implementation of such ideas. 
The responsibility for the theft of innovation falls equally 
on the transfer of R&D from military institutions to 
civilian and private agencies, as well as the ease with 
which information is transferred in modern times. 
Typically, a company’s main core competency 
is tied to an innovative product, process, or service 
that is protected by patents; yet, unscrupulous agents 
find little moral quandary in the theft of an idea. In 
a speech to the Office of the Director of National 
Intelligence, Bryant stated:
Today I would say the primary assets of corporate 
idea are intangible assets – certainly research and 
development, certainly plans and business plans, 
and really positions on contracts. The threat to the 
U.S. private sector is more exposed and vulnerable 
than ever.134
The threat to national security and the diffusion of 
technologies through theft by hostile actors becomes 
dangerous partially through the ever-increasing 
influence that globalization has on the West, in 
addition to the sheer quantity of occurring theft. 
While traditional human intelligence (HUMINT) 
sources have historically been the most utilized 
form of intelligence acquisition, the 21st century has 
witnessed the explosion of electronic intelligence 
(ELINT), cyber-espionage, and cyber-warfare. 
The reality and scale of cyber threats both to U.S. 
national security and the economy has now been 
realized, prompting the Pentagon to build complex 
defenses around military networks and create the 
new U.S. Cyber Command to integrate cyber 
defense with operations across the military.135 
However, there are still vast unprotected arenas 
 
134 Robert Bear Bryant to Office of the Director of National Intelligence. The 
Report to Congress on Foreign Economic Collection, ODNI Public Affairs. 
03 November 2011. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/
EconEsp_PressConf.pdf, (accessed 10 March 2012). 
135 Lynn, William J., III. “Defending a New Domain: The Pentagon’s Cyber-
strategy”. Foreign Affairs. 01 September 2010. http://www.foreignaffairs.
com/articles/66552/william-j-lynn-iii/defending-a-new-domain, (accessed 
03 April, 2012).
available to players interested in subverting  national 
security. According to The Economist, “the threat 
is complex, multifaceted and potentially very 
dangerous.  Modern societies are ever more reliant 
on computer systems linked to the Internet, giving 
enemies more avenues of attack.”136  Unfortunately, 
the threats are real and growing at an immeasurable 
rate. The information being stolen requires vigilance 
to defend as a critical national asset, and that in itself 
makes it worthwhile to protect.  According to Bryant, 
“What I see as an economic espionage, to a large 
extent, is really kind of a death by a thousand cuts. 
And these are being perpetrated by different actors –
sometimes foreign intelligence services, sometimes by 
corporations, sometimes by individuals.”
theft of iDeaS
The threat to the United States and its way of 
life, prosperity, and security is based in attacks by 
foreign entities on a regular basis as they attempt 
to steal not just America’s products or ideas, but its 
livelihood. The theft occurs in nearly every sphere as 
military and civilian targets are not distinguishable as 
foreign entities seek to draw out every last shred of 
information that is crucial to America. According to 
the Office of National Counter-Intelligence Executive 
report on stolen U.S. economic secrets, the categories 
of significant interest to foreign entities are:137
•	information	and	communications	technology
- forms the backbone of nearly every other 
technology
•	business	information
- could pertain to supplies of scarce natural 
resources or provide foreign actors an edge 
in negotiations with U.S. businesses or the 
U.S. government
•	military	technologies
- marine systems, UAVs, and other aerospace/
aeronautic technologies in particular
136 “The Threat from the Internet: Cyber War.” The Economist. 01 
July 2010. http://www.economist.com/node/16481504?story_
id=16481504&source=features_box1, (accessed 03 April 2012).
137 Foreign Spies Stealing US Economic Secrets in Cyberspace. Report to 
Congress. Office of the National Counterintelligence Executive. October 
2011. http://www.ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/Foreign_Eco-
nomic_Collection_2011.pdf, (accessed 03 April 2012).
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consideration, it is relevant to note that Huawei was 
founded in 1988 by Ren Zhengfei, a mere four years 
after retirement from the Chinese military where he 
finished his career as deputy director of the Science 
Research Institute of the Engineering Army Corps.153
The third method of acquiring foreign 
technologies, although technically legal in most 
instances, occurs when Chinese companies and state-
owned enterprises (SOE) purchase products with 
technologies requested to further grow Chinese S&T 
policies.  One of the largest targeted industries is 
aviation, publicized by a case that involved a Chinese 
individual who was arrested for attempting to purchase 
aerospace-related microchips from BAE Systems; this 
is one of the companies involved in the development 
of the Lockheed-Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.154 
Similar espionage may have played a role in China’s 
development of the new J-20 fifth-generation fighter, 
yet that remains mere conjecture.155 Other speculation 
abounds in China’s aviation industry, where it was 
alleged that they purchased the remains of Israel’s 
IAI Lavi and reverse-engineered it into the Chengdu 
J-10 Fighter.156  Although there is still debate as to 
the legitimacy of these claims, Russian engineers 
claimed to have knowledge of China’s possession of 
the Lavi, although the authenticity of those claims 
remains contested.157
Concerns about the theft of aviation technology 
are also shared by Russia.158 An arrangement was 
in place for China to acquire 200 Sukhoi SU-27 
Fighters, but China canceled the order early after 
reverse-engineering Russian avionics and electronics. 
China has recently revealed a version of Russia’s Al- 
31F engine that they have produced domestically, 
153 Engleman, Eric, “Huawei, ZTE Face Scrutiny From U.S. House Intel-
ligence Panel.” Bloomberg. 18 November 2011. http://www.bloomberg.
com/news/2011-11-17/house-intelligence-panel-probing-chinese-phone-
companies-in-u-s-.html, (accessed 03 April 2012). 
154 Noonan, Sean. “Chinese Espionage and French Trade Secrets.” Strat-
for. 20 January 2011. http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/20110119-chinese-
espionage-and-french-trade-secrets, (accessed 03 April 2012). 
155 Ibid.
156 Hewson, Robert. “Chinese J-10 ‘Benefited from the Lavi Project’”. IHS.19 
May 2008. http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-security-report.
aspx?id=1065926403, (accessed 03 April 2012). 
157 Ibid. 
158 Johnson, Reuben F. “Russian Industry Wary of Su-35 Sale to China.” 
IHS. 16 March 2012. http://www.janes.com/products/janes/defence-
security-report.aspx?ID=1065966179&channel=defence&subChannel=a
ir, (accessed 03 April 2012). 
comparable in both technology and performance. 
The Third Bureau of the MSS is responsible 
for purchasing targeted technologies through shell 
and front companies.159  Most of these businesses 
are run independently of overt Chinese intelligence 
management, though their leadership frequently 
includes individuals who maintain connections with 
intelligence officers, as previously noted in Guanxi 
personal networks. One recent case involved the 88 
Queensway Group, named for the address of an office 
building in central Hong Kong that houses many 
state-owned Chinese companies, along with the China 
Investment Corporation, the country’s sovereign 
wealth fund, and various private firms.160 A U.S. 
Congressional report shows a possible link between 
the building and “China’s intelligence apparatus.”161 
One of the most recent and brazen espionage 
cases conducted by China involves American 
Superconductor Corp (AMSC), a computer systems 
developer that serves as the electronic brains of wind 
turbines, being sold to a Chinese turbine manufacturer 
called Sinovel Wind Group Company. AMSC’s 
technicians were unable to get turbines to follow 
system commands and it was not until they consulted 
with their software department that they realized 
the Sinovel turbine was running a stolen version of 
AMSC’s software. The Beijing-based manufacturer 
was utilizing AMSC’s proprietary source code, and 
thus with no further need for AMSC, they terminated 
their agreement.162 
Even worse for American national security is that 
amongst Sinovel’s investors is a private equity group 
founded by Wen Yunsong, son of China’s Premier, 
Wen Jiabao.163 Shortly after the termination of the 
agreement, Sinoval’s Chairman and President Han 
Junliang helped create Dalian Guotong Electric, 
159 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics.” Stratfor. 24 
March 2010. 
160 Levkowitz, Lee, Marta McLellan Ross, and J.R. Warner. “The 88 Queen-
sway Group: A Case Study in Chinese Investors’ Operations in Angola 
and Beyond,” U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission. 10 
July 2009. http://www.uscc.gov/The_88_Queensway_Group.pdf,  (ac-
cessed 03 April 2012), 33-35.
161 Ibid.
162 Riley, Michael A. and Ashlee Vance. “China Corporate Espionage Boom 
Knocks Wind Out of U.S. Companies.” Bloomberg. 15 March 2012. http://
www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/china-corporate-espionage-
boom-knocks-wind-out-of-u-s-companies.html, (accessed 03 April 2012).
163 Ibid.
Agents gather technical intelligence in three primary 
ways: 142
1) Chinese nationals are asked to acquire 
targeted technologies while traveling
2) Foreign companies with the desired 
technologies are purchased by Chinese 
firms
3) Equipment with the desired technologies 
is purchased by Chinese front companies, 
usually in Hong Kong
The first method utilizing travelers, students, 
and student exchange programs, such as the Chinese 
Association of Scientists and Engineers in Japan 
(CASAJ) and the Association of Chinese Scientists 
and Engineers in Japan (ACSEJ), gains access to 
legally acquire knowledge on foreign technologies. 
The ACSEJ’s stated purpose is “to promote and 
strengthen cooperation and exchanges between 
Chinese scientists and engineers in Japan and between 
relevant organizations, institutions, and scholars in 
China and other countries, especially Japan.”143 Its 
bylaws note the manner in which these goals are 
to be met, including “helping form PRC Science 
&Technology (S&T) policy and supporting China’s 
development of new high technology.”144 
In 2011, James Dyson, inventor of the bagless 
vacuum cleaner, warned that Chinese students were 
stealing technological and scientific secrets from UK 
universities.145 He also noted that Chinese students 
were planting malware that would relay information 
to China even after their departure from the 
university.146
The mimicry of espionage methods should come 
142 Ibid.
143 “Chinese Science and Technology Supported in Japan”. Office of the 
National Counterintelligence Executive. March 2003. http://www.ncix.gov/
docs/CHINESE_SUPPORT_GROUPS_JAPAN.pdf, (accessed 03 April 
2012).
144 Ibid.
145 “Foreign Economic Collection and Industrial Espionage Reports”. Office 
of the National Counterintelligence Executive. October 2011. http://www.
ncix.gov/publications/reports/fecie_all/index.php, (accessed 03 April 
2012).
146 Ibid.
as no surprise, as China’s manner of espionage has 
been emulated by South Korea’s Ministry of Science 
and Technology (MOST) which is said to have 
quadrupled its support for “informal” acquisition of 
foreign technology; read espionage.147  According to 
ROK news reports, part of the spending will be directed 
towards a consolidated brainpool administered by 
Seoul to recruit foreign scientists.148 MOST planned 
on using the program to solve domestic technological 
bottlenecks and to absorb advances and technological 
knowledge.  As part of the spending increase, Seoul 
hosts a triennial event that attracts domestic and 
overseas Korean scientists for the purpose of sharing 
new scientific and technological information. 
Ethnic Koreans numbering 291 and hailing from 12 
countries were said to have been in attendance. The 
event’s theme was described as contributing to South 
Korea’s competitiveness through the globalization of 
science and technology.149 
The second method of foreign technology 
procurement is through the acquisition of foreign 
companies. China National Aero-Technology Import 
& Export Corporation (CATIC) purchased the 
American defense firm Mamco Manufacturing in the 
1990s, despite a direct connection between CATIC 
and the People’s Liberation Army (PLA).150  An inside 
source noted that Chinese companies such as Huawei 
Technologies withdrew a bid to purchase 3Com, 
a U.S. Internet and networking company, after an 
investigation found links to China’s intelligence 
services.151 In 2008, Huawei established a joint venture 
with the U.S. anti-virus software company Symantec, 
headquartered in Chengdu, China.  Currently, it only 
offers software in China, but Stratfor sources suggest 
that if Huawei were to be used for Chinese intelligence, 
it could easily insert spyware into computer systems 
which subscribe to its service.152  As a backdrop to this 
 
147 “South Korea: Large Boost in Funds For Technology Transfer.” Office of 
the National Counterintelligence Executive. March 2003. http://www.ncix.
gov/docs/SKoreaBoostsFundsForTechTransfer.pdf, (accessed 03 April 
2012).
148 Ibid.
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150 “Special Report: Espionage with Chinese Characteristics.” Stratfor. 24 
March 2010.
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External USB drives are available for less than $10, 
yet their potential as a vehicle to deliver malware is 
increasing as the seemingly innocuous device can have 
malware code embedded.  Left in the open or mailed 
to a recipient as a gift, as soon as they are plugged into 
a port they can then infect the entire network, which 
up until that point may have been private and secure. 
The Creech AFB case is just one of many 
documented accounts. A 2008 DOD report of a 
U.S. military installation in the Middle East details 
the breaching of the base due to a USB drive and the 
transfer of data to a server under foreign control.173 
One of the greatest issues with the use of devices 
manufactured overseas such as USB drives, or any 
such peripheral, is that the manufacture of computer 
chips and hardware for Western companies and 
governments could come from the factory loaded 
with malware, and that most USB drives are already 
infected before they leave the factory.174 The Pentagon 
has recently banned the use of USB drives due to the 
unknown nature of foreign factories and the countries 
in which they are located.175
netWork intruSionS anD anti-viruS
The extent to which foreign nations use the 
interconnected nature of computers to steal technology 
has forced companies and governments to maintain 
stringent operational standards in order to sustain 
the privacy and security of their networks.  Examples 
of this include the Stuxnet and Shadyrat viruses; 
two documented cases of intrusions into networks 
too complex to have been perpetrated by criminal 
organizations and appear to have links to intelligence 
organizations.176 Incidents such as Operation Shady 
Rat and the use of remote access tools to commandeer 
computers of particular Asian countries were said to 
 
 
173 Lynn, William J. III, “Defending A New Domain.” 01 September 2010.
174 “Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack.” Stratfor. 02 March 2009. 
http://www.uspoliticsonline.net/science-technology/51078-chinas-cyber-
war-against-world.html, (accessed 03 April 2012).
175 Ibid.
176 “Building A Cyber Secure Plant.” Siemens Totally Integrated Automation. 
30 September 2010. http://www.totallyintegratedautomation.com/2010/09/
building-a-cyber-secure-plant/, (accessed 03 April 2012). 
have lasted longer than two years.177
For data protection managers, the most chilling 
element in malware and cyber attacks is the complicity 
of some anti-virus manufacturers.  A conflict of interest 
arises where there have been links forged between 
anti-virus companies and foreign intelligence services. 
Huawei, the aforementioned telecommunications 
company which attempted to purchase the U.S.-
based 3Com, has established a joint venture with 
the U.S. anti-virus manufacturer Symantec. The 
partnership has obvious conflicts of interest as 
much of the malware and bots in distribution have 
some connection with advancing China’s needs in 
technology and intelligence gathering.178 
teLecommunicationS Breach
Another espionage method has been the subversion 
of telecommunications networks, both domestically 
and in foreign countries. Most reported cases of 
incursions are through IP rerouting, fraudulent secure 
socket layers (SSLs), and physical phone tampering. 
Reuters reported that in 2010, Internet traffic was 
rerouted through a foreign server controlled by a 
state-owned enterprise (SOE).179 The hijacked IP 
belonged to the U.S. government and military sites 
including the DOD, the armed forces, and a few 
select commercial websites.180 Intelligence services 
also note that digital certificates (falsely) confirming 
the legitimacy of websites and fraudulently-issued 
SSLs have been issued in order to allow foreign 
countries to send and receive transmissions to lure 
unsuspecting individuals to compromise passwords 
or disclose confidential trade secrets.181 
 Foreign countries are also utilizing travel and 
business to compromise international trade secrets. 
177 Finkle, Jim. “Q+A-Massive cyber attack dubbed ‘Operation Shady RAT.’” 
Reuters. 03 August 2011. http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/08/03/
cyberattacks-idUSN1E76R22Q20110803, (accessed 03 April 2012).
178 “Pushing Ahead of the Cyberwarfare Pack.” Stratfor. 02 March 2009.
179 Wolf, Jim. “Pentagon Says “Aware” of China Internet Rerouting.” 
Reuters. 19 November 2010. http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/11/19/
us-cyber-china-pentagon-idUSTRE6AI4HJ20101119, (accessed 03 April 
2012). 
180 Ibid.
181 Keizer, Gregg. “Hackers Steal SSL Certificates for CIA, MI6, Mossad.” 
Computer World. 4 September 2011. http://www.computerworld.com/s/
article/9219727/Hackers_steal_SSL_certificates_for_CIA_MI6_Mossad, 
(accessed 03 April 2012). 
making himself chairman and granting Sinovel a 20 
percent stake.164 After opening up a second Sinovel 
turbine, AMSC investigators noted that an AMSC 
power converter had been swapped for a Guotong-
manufactured duplicate.165
Although most countries that seek American IP and 
technology have dedicated HUMINT organizations, 
China is the exception. Nearly 70 percent of Chinese 
intelligence operations are not directly conducted 
by Chinese intelligence services such as the MSS, 
MPS, or MID.166 Most open source intelligence is 
gathered by a wide array of civil Chinese institutions 
that are only marginally distanced from the PLA. An 
example of a civilian agency performing espionage for 
China’s S&T is the State Administration for Science, 
Technology and Industry for National Defense 
(SASTIND). Although administrated separately from 
the PLA, it indirectly makes recommendations to the 
Central Military Commission (CMC) for research 
and planning in technological military development, 
functionally akin to DARPA in the United States.167 
tranSition to eLint
The necessity of gathering intelligence from 
multiple sources and implement the acquired 
knowledge is a race amongst nations. Mikhail 
Fradkov, a former Deputy Minister for Foreign 
Economic Relations and the current director of 
Russian foreign intelligence, explains that intelligence 
“aims at supporting the process of modernization of 
our country and creating the optimal conditions for 
the development of its science and technology.”168
maLWare
The multitude of channels used by foreign nations 
to conduct espionage on the United States, legal or 
otherwise, shows the dedication and priority placed 
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on acquiring American ideas.  Though HUMINT 
sources and shell corporations have historically 
been prominent tools, the emergence of computer 
networking and the vast globalization of business 
have made the U.S. even more susceptible to threats 
from multiple sources. The vast wasteland of the 
Internet, devoid of market forces or global policing 
to control it, has proven to be a complicated border 
to seal, and the extent of damage done to America’s 
progress is difficult to calculate. Some cases exist where 
HUMINT sources leak technology intentionally and 
electronically such as the theft of B-1B technology 
at Rockwell which was sold to the Chinese aviation 
industry by a Chinese engineer.169  
Yet, most of the espionage of the 21st century will 
be through electronic and cyber means.  Cyber-attacks 
can come through multiple avenues, as many of the 
most recent and blatant incursions have revealed. 
These penetrations are miniscule in perspective 
to the quantity of successful incursions. Recently 
reported events in the media, such as the keylogging 
of Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs) and Unmanned 
Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAVs) flown from Creech 
Air Force Base in Nevada, may not directly be the 
theft of technology or ideas, yet they show the modus 
operandi (MO) and operational procedures of U.S. 
proprietary technology.170  Vulnerabilities are noted as 
in the case of Iraqi insurgents gaining multiple days 
of footage of UAVs and UCAVs operating in Iraq. 
Foreign entities can take advantage of the unencrypted 
streaming video and design systems to operate in the 
same manner as the United States unmanned vehicle 
program.171 
uSB peripheraLS
The keylogging program embedded and running 
in the background of Creech AFB’s private and secure 
network was perpetrated with one of the cheapest 
and most commonly used computer peripheral.172 
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encompass a broad, overreaching category such 
as terrorists, hackers, militias, and websites like 
WikiLeaks. Yet they all share a broad advantage over 
the rest of their counterparts: the United States has 
publicly declared that cyber attacks and espionage 
from foreign nations may be considered a declaration 
of war; yet, the quasi-state actor is difficult to declare 
war upon due to the difficulty of tracing origins in 
addition to their use of proxy servers.  Furthermore, 
the deterrence strategy of “mutually assured 
destruction” prevalent during the Cold War appears 
to be ineffective against quasi-state actors who have 
no concrete, physical location or allegiance to any 
particular nationality. For quasi-state actors with 
legitimate ties to a nationality or corporation, the 
advantage would appear to be the plausible deniability 
of their actions. 
eSpionage economicS anD Democracy
The globalization of markets and cultures has 
provided the corporate world with unparalleled 
access to customers and sources of manufacture. Yet, 
the diffusion of intellectual property in both civilian 
and military spheres has given rise to foreign nations 
acquiring technology that is crucial to American 
culture and values.  The development of these ideas is 
to be accessible only in free and democratic societies 
wherein people are challenged to think outside the 
box and are rewarded for their creativity in doing so. 
The steps to grow democracy and the free markets to 
exploit the ingenuity are being skipped ahead of by 
nation-states that lack the means to develop their own 
creative potential. Rather than allowing the shifting of 
power to citizens or giving them the ability to operate 
in a heterogeneous society, nations are gaining the 
after-effects without putting in the necessary time to 
see those developments happen locally and naturally.
For those nations stealing ideas, the long-term 
issue becomes that the emphasis is placed on reverse-
engineering and deconstruction of foreign ideas, be 
it a physical product or a process, while it would be 
better to invest their efforts in developing their own 
ideas. Otherwise, host nations of technologies will 
 
 
unveil newer technology before the reverse engineer 
is complete.  According to Willy Shih, a professor 
at Harvard Business School, countries employing 
espionage will need to develop their own research 
and development process and mindset to succeed 
their skills of copying others.187 He continued, noting 
that  “many countries go through an imitation phase, 
but the real challenge is moving to an innovation 
phase.”188 China and other countries are introducing 
programs aimed at developing key deficiencies in 
market or military competitiveness. Programs such as 
the National High Technology Program (P863) target 
key deficiencies in sectors crucial to China’s long-
term competitiveness and national security. Those 
goals sometimes include the clandestine acquisition 
of American technologies.189
concLuSion
The concept of military size as the principle 
means of power has been drastically altered in the 
21st century.  American assets for espionage are ever 
increasing, as are the adversaries attempting to steal 
them.  Drastic reforms to electronic data transmission 
will become battlegrounds for contentious debate in 
the House and Senate.  For America to continue to 
assert its global power militarily and economically, 
the corporate, civil, and military worlds will have 
to cooperatively protect America’s largest assets: its 
human capital and ingenuity.  By securing these, the 
United States can remain a stronghold for valuable 
ideas and innovation of new ways to improve the 
world as a whole, and the lives of those who live on it. 
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There are reported cases of China’s Public Security 
Bureau (PSB, the Chinese equivalent of the FBI) 
going to Western hotel chains in China during the 
2008 Olympics, with assertions that they had to 
install “special internet monitoring devices” that 
would give the PSB unprecedented access to foreign 
communications, and potentially even foreign 
trade secrets.182 
The threat to American innovation is a direct 
challenge to American prosperity according to 
Jeffrey Goldberg of Bloomberg News; advanced 
American technological innovations are “the 
physical manifestation of American ingenuity and 
confidence.”183 The perpetrators of the theft that 
affects American prosperity are wide ranging, but 
most actors fall into three categories: state actors, 
non-state actors, and quasi-state actors.
State actorS
State actors such as state intelligence agencies have 
historically been the largest parties concerned with 
the theft of military technology, yet the dependence 
on economic strength and the hoarding of raw 
materials have become a larger priority of national 
security. Countries have employed Competitive 
Intelligence Solution (CIS) to obtain open source 
information in addition to utilizing spy agencies to 
gather intelligence. Yet, the foreign policy nightmare 
of getting caught operating in a foreign area has 
forced some intelligence services to utilize the other 
two actors to maintain plausible deniability. 
non-State actorS
Due to the globalization of markets and the spread 
of corporatism, corporations have more commonly 
been utilizing spy agency and espionage tactics 
to gain a market advantage or as part of a broader 
national security initiative.  Companies such as the 
infamous 88 Queensway Group have holdings vital 
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to strategic Chinese interests in a variety of countries, 
including:184
 
						•	Angola	 	 •	Argentina
•	Bermuda		 •	Congo
•	Cote	d’Ivoire	 •	Indonesia
•	Israel	 	 •	Mozambique
•	Nigeria	 	 •	North	Korea
•	Portugal	 	 •	Russia
•	Singapore	 •	Tanzania
•	United	States	 •	Venezuela
88 Queensway Group appears to have connections 
with Chinese State Security; however, many 
corporations acquire foreign technology through 
illegitimate means with no national security initiative 
and are focused solely on industrial espionage.185 
Preferred companies to be targeted are often well-
regarded global producers such as: Ford, Valspar, 
Rockwell, GM, Boeing, BAE Systems, DuPont, 
Dow Chemical, Google, Apple, Lockheed Martin, 
Microsoft, and most recently, Renault.
QuaSi-State actorS
The final actors involved in intellectual property 
theft are the individuals and small organizations 
which exploit industrial espionage for personal 
gain and concealed motives.  While nations and 
companies often have similar end goals, they usually 
have different methods of attaining said objectives; 
quasi-state actors have veiled intentions and their 
purposes appear concealed. Incidents such as the 
malware embedded at Creech AFB’s private servers 
may be viewed as part of a nationalist agenda, yet 
when footage of operational procedures of UAVs and 
UCAVs appear on insurgents’ computers in Iraq, they 
seem to have less of a strategic and more of a tactical 
purpose.186 
The “quasi-state actor” branding tends to 
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 The Strategic Intelligence Society is a campus club at Liberty University in Lynchburg, 
Virginia. The purpose of the Strategic Intelligence Society is to prepare undergraduate students 
for employment within the Intelligence Community by encouraging critical thinking that 
leads to the analysis of current events: specifically, the ability to discern intelligence from 
information within the fields of politics, technology, transnational issues, economics, 
and military policy. This is accomplished by providing the students with a multitude of 
opportunities, which include interactive sessions with guest speakers from various fields 
within government, the intelligence community, and law enforcement, a variety of 
intelligence-related extra-curricular opportunities, and various analytical publications. The 
Strategic Informer is the publication of the Strategic Intelligence Society, featuring articles 
from distinguished faculty members within the Helms School of Government at Liberty 
University as well as selected articles from top student contributors concentrating on current 
affairs pertaining to intelligence, law enforcement, and national security. 
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